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Appropriate reliance on automation is critical in 
high-risk/high-stress contexts such as military 
operations. The current study examines how stress 
affects the decision to rely on automation. Reliance 
will be examined using a decision making framework, 
taking into account the cognitive processes that are 
being affected by stress. Additionally, the role of 
feedback is essential in updating information to be able 
to make a more informed decision in the future. 
Reliability of automation will be manipulated so that 
actual reliability will be lower than expected reliability 
in one condition, and will be the same as expected in 
the other. Participants’ ability to incorporate feedback 
into subsequent reliance decisions will be assessed 
between stress conditions. Finally, since motivation 
can encourage more deliberate thinking, motivation 
will be manipulated between subjects. A better 
understanding of how reliance decisions are made 
under stress can inform the design of systems for better 
human-automation collaboration.  
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Human-automation teams have been seen to 
outperform both human-human teams and automation 
alone (e.g., Radiology [11], Freestyle Chess [22]). 
However, the potential of enhanced collaboration and 
performance will not be fully realized unless we 
understand how interacting with automation affects the 
thinking and decision making processes of humans, 
and how those cognitive processes translate into 
reliance behaviors. 
Human collaboration with autonomy, from personal 
navigation assistance on a smart phone to global 
missile defense command and control systems, is only 
beneficial when the autonomous systems are relied on 
appropriately. Over- or under-reliance on automation 
can have serious consequences in high-risk contexts. 
Over reliance occurs when humans are too reliant on 
automation and fail to intervene when an error occurs, 
either due to overconfidence in the automation or not 
noticing the failure because they are “out-of-the-loop” 
[12]. For example, being so reliant on automated 
navigation that when an anomaly occurs (e.g., GPS 
signal is lost) it goes unnoticed and results in a ship 
running around [26]. Under reliance occurs when 
humans are reluctant to use automation, even when it 
out performs their own capabilities.  
Because humans have limited processing capacity 
[21], most everyday judgments are based on heuristics 
and biases that give rise to an intuitive response [45]. 
The use of these mental shortcuts to inform judgments 
mostly leads to efficient decision making, however, 
intuitive judgment can also be misleading. Intuitive 
processes are in contrast to more deliberative processes 
that engage a slower, more methodical process [45]. 
While there are numerous factors involved in deciding 
whether to rely on automation (e.g., reliability, 
expertise, trust) [19], thinking through multiple 
dimensions requires engagement of deliberative 
thinking. The nature of the context and tasks will 
determine how much cognitive resources are required 
to think through these dimension. Some contexts or 
tasks may leave little cognitive resources, and therefore 
intuitive judgments are all that may be available. 
Understanding what these intuitive judgments look like 
in regards to reliance on automation needs to be better 
understood, particularly in high stress contexts.  
Contexts characterized by high stress can alter 
thinking and decision making strategies, potentially 
causing humans to make inappropriate reliance 
decisions. There is evidence to suggest that pressure 
situations may lead to increased reliance [37]. Rice and 
Keller [37] examined reliance on automation with and 
without time pressure. They found time pressure 
increased overall reliance regardless of trust ratings. 
These findings suggest that time pressure induces 
rushed information processing leaving little time for 
deliberation, and consciously switching to an intuitive-
based decision making approach may be the most 
optimal strategy. While time pressure might increase 
stress, it is not the same construct as stress. However, 







the study provides initial evidence to suggest reliance 
decisions are altered in pressured situations. Stress, in 
the absence of time pressure may lead to a similar, but 
unconscious shift in processing due to limited 
cognitive resources as opposed to a conscious shift in 
strategy due to time constraints.  
While understanding when there is a change in 
reliance is important, it is more informative to know 
why there is a change in reliance. Looking at reliance 
in terms of thinking and decision making processes can 
help explain why a change in reliance occurs in high 
stress environments. Turning to the literature on stress 
and decision making helps to shed light on what might 
prompt this shift in reliance behavior.  
 
2. Stress and decision making  
 
The prefrontal cortex (PFC) is integral in higher 
order executive functions such as the integration of 
information and top-down attention allocation [7], [1]. 
In the context of optimal decision making, attending to 
and integrating relevant information is essential. 
Unfortunately, the PFC is largely negatively affected 
by the neurological reactions induced by stress [1].  
Acute stress promotes the release of (a) 
glucocorticoids (cortisol in humans) through activation 
of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis [9], 
[16], [41], and (b) catecholamines (dopamine, 
epinephrine, and norepinephrine) through activation of 
the sympathetic-adrenal-medullary (SAM) axis [16], 
[38], [39].  Cortisol, dopamine, epinephrine, and 
norepinephrine can alter PFC and amygdala activity, 
leading to decreased activation in the PFC and 
increased activation in the amygdala [16]. The decline 
in resources needed to support PFC dependent 
functions can result in a shift towards a more intuitive, 
less deliberative processing of information [28]. 
Margittai et al. reported this shift in processing, in 
which participants who were administered 
hydrocortisone (cortisol agonist) scored lower on the 
cognitive reflection task (CRT; a task that measures 
deliberate over intuitive processing) [28].  
As stated previously, engagement of PFC 
dependent functions is critical for deliberative decision 
making. In addition to deliberate processing, decision 
making requires enough cognitive resources to (a) 
retrieve relevant information (knowledge and past 
experiences) from long-term memory, (b) hold and 
integrate all information in working memory in order 
to make a decision, and (c) to use feedback to update 
existing information for subsequent decision making 
[5]. The reallocation of cognitive resources away from 
the PFC may lead to the inability to learn from, and 
integrate feedback that provides relevant information 
for subsequent decision making. In the context of 
reliance on automation, if expected reliability does not 
match actual reliability the cognitive resources need to 
be available to (a) notice such a discrepancy, and (b) 
incorporate feedback in order to appropriately update 
the new reliability information in memory. The use of 
feedback in decision making is important when 
previous outcomes provide information on which to 
base future decisions (e.g., the reliability of a decision 
aid). Unfortunately, research has shown that stress can 
impair the ability to learn from feedback [42]. This 
impairment to learn from feedback may result in a 
continued reliance on automation, even when the 
reliability of that automation is lower than expected.  
The deleterious effect of stress on PFC-dependent 
functions causes a shift towards intuitive-based 
decision making, while the inability to learn from and 
integrate feedback can lead to suboptimal decisions 
when learning and deliberative processing are required. 
However, moderating factors, such as motivation, may 
ameliorate the deleterious effect of stress on decision 
making. Motivation has been shown to alter top-down 
attention allocation strategies [27]. Locke and Braver 
[27] found that monetary incentive (e.g., reward) was 
associated with changes in PFC activity. While 
motivation has been found to have a positive effect on 
PFC activity, it is unclear whether this effect extends to 
stress conditions. 
 
3. Current study  
 
At a general level, the current study aims to 
investigate the decision to rely on automation in 
contexts characterized by stress and uncertainty, 
particularly those related to military operations. More 
specifically, the goals of this study are to assess (a) if 
stress prompts an overall shift towards reliance on 
automation, (b) to what extent feedback is incorporated 
to inform subsequent decisions in stress and non-stress 
conditions, (c) the role of motivation as a potential 
moderator for the deleterious effect of stress on 
decision making, and (d) how strongly trust correlates 
with reliance between stress conditions. 
Participants will be recruited from The Naval 
Postgraduate School. Participation will not be limited 
to students, but is expected to be approximately 85% 
students, based on previous experimentation. While the 
age is only restricted to above 18 years old, the mean 
age, based on previous studies is expected to be 35-40. 
However, there are more students in their early 20s, 
and therefore the mean age may be lower than 
anticipated. Additionally, it is expected that the 
majority of participants will be male, previous studies 
have seen anywhere from 59% to 85% male dominant. 




military officers (all branches are represented at the 
school), if enough civilians are recruited, differences 
between populations will be examined.  
Participants will be exposed to either a stress or 
control condition, after which they will complete a 
pattern learning task that involves choosing what  
number (i.e., 1, 2, or 3) will come next in the sequence. 
Participants will initially make their decision, they will 
then receive advice from a decision aid, and then they 
will make their final choice. . The decision to rely on 
automation is only relevant when there is a discrepancy 
in the participant’s choice and the decision aid’s 
advice; in such cases the participant will then need to 
decide whether to rely on the decision aid or stay with 
their own choice [10]. Reliability of the decision aid 
will be manipulated to assess whether feedback is 
incorporated into subsequent reliance decisions 
between the stress conditions.  
Based on the literature covered previously, the 
following hypotheses are predicted: 
1. The deleterious effect of stress on cognitive 
functions, specifically working memory and attention 
are hypothesized to result in an automatic, intuitive-
based decision making approach, and an overall 
increase in reliance on automation in the stress than 
non-stress condition.  
2. Feedback about the reliability of the decision 
aid that is inconsistent with the expected reliability of 
the aid will be noticed and incorporated into 
subsequent reliability decisions less frequently in the 
high than low stress condition.  
3. Motivation will have a moderating effect on 
the ability to notice and incorporate feedback 
information via enhanced attention to relevant goal-
oriented information in both the stress and non-stress 
conditions.  
4. While reliance is predicted to increase in the 
stress compared to non-stress condition, no difference 
is predicted in trust behavior (as assessed by a 
subjective questionnaire, and trust game [3]). 
 
4. Procedure and materials  
 
4.1. Stress manipulation 
  
Stress induction in a laboratory setting can be 
challenging, particularly in obtaining physiological 
responses that are congruent with real world stressors. 
In a meta-analysis [9], laboratory stress induction 
techniques that were uncontrollable (i.e., inability to 
control one or more aspects of the situation) and 
included social-evaluative threat (i.e., disapproval of 
others) produced the highest elevations in the stress-
related hormone, cortisol. The most commonly used 
stress-induction technique is the Trier Social Stress 
Test (TSST; [23]), and includes both uncontrollability 
and social-evaluative threat. The TSST is currently 
considered the “gold standard” to elicit stress responses 
in a laboratory setting [41].  
Participants will be randomly assigned to the high 
or low stress condition. In the high stress condition, 
The TSST will be administered, and consists of three 
five-minute phases: (a) anticipatory phase – 
participants will be told to prepare a speech explaining 
why they should receive their next promotion; (b) 
speech phase –  participants will deliver their speech in 
front of a “committee” of two people that they are told 
are experts in non-verbal behavior; and (c) mental 
math phase – participants will be asked to continually 
subtract the number 13 from 1022 as fast and 
accurately as possible. In the low stress condition, a 
TSST control procedure will be administered (p-TSST 
[17]), which consists of the same phases as the TSST, 
but lacks the social-evaluative and uncontrollability 
elements that are considered the main stressors 
underlying the effectiveness of the TSST [9].  
Stress will be assessed through (a) physiological 
indicators, (b) salivary cortisol, and (c) a subjective 
questionnaire to ensure participants responded as 
intended to the stress manipulation.  
a. The physiological indicators of stress, heart 
rate variability (HRV) and electrodermal activity 
(EDA), will be obtained through the Empatica E4 
wristband [15]. These measures will be taken 
continuously throughout the experiment. While there 
are several indices that can be taken as measures of 
HRV, the four most common indices will be used in 
this study; (a) standard deviation of the intervals 
(SDNN) [30]; (b) square root of the mean squared 
differences between inter-beat intervals (RMSSD) 
[32]; (c) the proportion of the inter-beat interval (RR) 
that deviate by more than 50ms from the previous 
interval (pNN50) [43], and (d) the low to high 
frequency ratio (LF/HF Ratio) [24], [43]. 
b. Salivary cortisol is commonly collected as 
indication of stress in laboratory studies, as cortisol is 
known to be released in response to a stressor [41]. 
Salivary cortisol will be collected six times throughout 
the experiment (after the rest period, 1 minute prior to 
the stress induction, 1 minute after stress induction, 
and every 10 minutes afterwards [23] via passive drool, 
and stored at -20 degrees Celsius [41]. Due to concerns 
in awakening cortisol levels, all testing will take place 
in the afternoon, starting at 1300 [41]. Saliva samples 
containing visible blood will be discarded. Cortisol is 
sensitive to various factors including health, 
medication use, and food intake. Therefore, 
participants will be asked to abstain from exercise, 




experiment. There are also exclusionary criteria for 
participation. Participants will be excluded if they have 
a psychiatric illness, cardiovascular disease, or 
neuroendocrine disorder. Additional factors that affect 
cortisol will be accounted for in the exit questionnaire, 
such as caffeine and food intake, smoking, any 
medications currently being taken, menstrual cycle – 
for females, and what time they woke up that morning 
[41]. 
Repeated sampling allows for cortisol change 
comparison in response to the stressor ([41]). To test 
whether there was a difference in cortisol between the 
stress and no stress conditions a 2 (stress condition) x 6 
(time points) repeated measures ANOVA will be run, 
Greenhouse-Geisser correction will be applied as 
appropriate (e.g., [34]; [28]; [42]; [13]). Additionally, 
because the interest is specifically in the increase in 
cortisol over time, area under the curve with respect to 
increase (AUCI) will be assessed between groups as 
well ([36], [29], [25]).  
Regardless of assigned condition, it is also 
interesting to see if cortisol increase as determined by 
AUCI predicts reliance on automation. In a hierarchical 
regression analysis, with reliance as the dependent 
variable, AUCI will be entered as the first independent 
variable, followed by Ospan score, and finally, an 
interaction variable AUCI and Ospan. 
c. The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule 
(PANAS [48]) will be administered twice (at baseline 
and again after the TSST). The PANAS measures 
affect on a 5-point scale, and consists of 10 positive 
and 10 negative emotions.  
 
4.2. Experimental task 
  
The main task participants will engage in has been 
repeatedly used in reliance on automation studies (e.g., 
[10]). Participants are told to make a prediction about 
the next number in a pattern learning task (either 1, 2, 
or 3). The pattern learning task requires gradual 
learning, so that in the first few trials when participants 
are presented with 1, 2, or 3, they will have to guess. 
After a few repeated trials, they should start to see a 
pattern forming, and be able to make a more informed 
prediction. The sequence of each trial is as follows: (a) 
participants will make their prediction, (b) the decision 
aid will offer a suggestion, (c) participants will make 
their final prediction, (d) participants will rate their 
confidence in their final prediction, and (e) the correct 
answer will be shown. There will be one practice round 
consisting of 40 trials, and then one experimental block 
consisting of 100 trials. The pattern that will be used is 
2, 3, 1, 2, 3 [10]. The pattern is generated so that there 
are 100 numbers. There will be deviations in the 
pattern to prevent perfect learning; there has to be 
some ambiguity in order to decide whether or not to 
rely on automation when there is disagreement.  
 
4.3. Automation reliability 
  
There will be two decision aids with different 
reliabilities. Decision Aid 1 will have 85% reliability, 
and decision Aid 2 will have 60% reliability. 
Participants will be told in the beginning that both 
decision aids have a reliability of approximately 85%. 
Therefore, an 85% reliable decision aid would match 
participants’ expectations of high reliability, however, 
60% would not match expectations, and is generally 
considered unreliable (i.e., < 70% [49]). Only one 
decision aid will offer advice per trial, however the 
decision aids will be presented evenly via, intermixed 
blocks of 10, so that the participants are utilizing the 
same decision aid for 10 iterations at a time. The 
presentation order will be counterbalanced between 
participants. The practice trials will be presented with 




Participants will be randomly assigned to the 
motivation or non-motivation condition. Participants in 
the motivation condition will earn $0.20 for each 
correct response, with the potential to earn $30 over all 
the experimental trials. Participants in the non-
motivation condition will earn money for correct 
responses, however, they will not be told beforehand, 
nor will they be shown an ongoing total. A reward, as 
opposed to loss, paradigm was chosen due the evidence 
showing that loss may induce worry and task irrelevant 
thoughts, and may not necessarily lead to increased 
performance [35]. Paschke et al. [35] found that 
although losses increased general attention control, and 
gains increased specific attention control, performance 
was better in the gain than loss condition. Therefore, 
this study will utilize gains instead of losses (a) in 
order to maximize performance, and (b) to avoid 
confounding the effect of stress with additional stress 




After signing the informed consent, an Empatica E4 
wristband will be fitted on the participant’s wrist to 
start collecting physiological data. Participants will 
then rest for 10 minutes to collect baseline 
physiological readings. After rest, a saliva sample will 
be collected and participants will fill out the PANAS. 
A measure of working memory capacity, the operation 




PANAS. Next, participants will be introduced to the 
experimental task with a cover story; a modified 
version of the story used in [10] where participants will 
be told that a software company is interested in 
evaluating their “pattern learning software before 
applying it to more complex tasks on naval ships” [10, 
p. 416]. The cover story will lead to task instructions, 
and then participants will practice the experimental 
task. Instructions and practice will be conducted before 
the stress manipulation so that task learning is not 
impaired by stress. The TSST or p-TSST task will be 
administered, after which another PANAS will be 
administered. Participants will then complete the CRT 
before performing the experimental task. Afterwards, 
the participant will be administered a series of 
measures and questionnaires in the following sequence, 
(a) trust game, (b) lottery game, and (c) exit 
questionnaire. Finally, participants will be fully 
debriefed, asked for a second consent to use their data, 
and paid according to how much they earned in the 
experiment, with a ceiling of $50. Incentive-based 
compensation is commonly used in motivation or trust 
designs (e.g., [47], [4], [8], [20]). 
 
4.6. Eye tracking 
  
Eye tracking is a common measure to infer 
cognitive processes [31]. In decision making research, 
dwell time and pupil dilation have been used to 
understand the cognitive processes involved in 
decisions [6]. Participants will be calibrated to a non-
invasive, screen-based eye tracker that samples at 
60Hz and measures pupilometry. Calibration will occur 
after participants complete the first PANAS, but before 
the Ospan task. Pupil dilation in the Ospan task will be 
used as an indication of cognitive load. Participants 
will be recalibrated after the TSST (or pTSST). Eye 
tracking and pupil dilation measures will then be 
collected throughout the remainder of the experiment, 
with particular interest in the experimental task, trust 
games, CRT, and lottery game. 
 
4.7. Operation span task (OSPAN) 
  
Working memory capacity has been shown to 
moderate the effect of stress on some PFC-dependent 
tasks (e.g., model-based learning; [33]). Because of 
this, it is important to get a pre-stress measure of 
working memory capacity to assess if individual 
differences in working memory moderate the effect of 
stress on decision making. The automated OSPAN task 
procedure will be used [46], where a mathematical 
equation is shown and participants have to indicate 
whether it is correct, then a letter is presented on the 
screen. After a set of 3-7 trials is shown, participants 
then have to recall the letters that were presented in the 
correct order of presentation. There will be a total of 75 
trials so that all set lengths (3-7) are presented three 
times.  
 
4.8. Trust game 
  
The trust game is a common measure of human-
human trust, originally developed in economic 
literature [3]. The trust game is usually played between 
two people, where one person will invest a certain 
amount of money (investor) with the other person 
(investee), however much is invested is tripled and 
given to the investee. The investee then decides how 
much of the money to keep and how much to share 
back with the investor. In the current experiment, the 
investee will be the decision aid. The participant will 
be given the opportunity to invest up to half of the 
money they earned throughout the experiment with the 
decision aids they were working with; they can invest 
with either one or both. They will be told that the 
money they decide to invest will be tripled, and that the 
decision aid will then make the decision on how much 
to return to the participant, the decision aid can return 
any amount of the money received. For example, if the 
participant invested $10 with the decision aid, the 
decision aid would receive $30, and could 
hypothetically share $0 to $30 back with the 
participant. The trust game will be administered to 
examine (a) if reliance on automation correlates with 
trust game investments, and (b) subjective trust 
measurement correlates with a commonly used 
objective trust measure. Participants will find out at the 
end of the experiment how much the decision aid chose 
to share back with them. Again, the ceiling for earnings 
is $50. 
 
4.9. Cognitive reflection task (CRT) 
  
The CRT is a measure of analytic thinking [14]. 
The CRT is a short task, involving three questions.  
1. A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat 
costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does 
the ball cost? 
2. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 
widgets, how long would it take 100 machines 
to make 100 widgets? 
3. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every 
day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 
days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how 
long would it take for the patch to cover the 





Stress has been found to have a negative impact on 
analytic thinking, resulting in lower CRT scores [28], 
[40]. Therefore, the CRT will be used as an objective 
measure of analytic thinking under stress. 
 
4.10. Lottery game 
  
Because some investments might be seen as a 
measure of propensity for risk as opposed to an 
indication of trust, it is important to have a risk task. 
The lottery task is set-up the same as the trust game, 
except participants will gamble (instead of invest) up 
to half of their earnings and will be told there will be a 
random chance that they will receive any money back 
[2].  
 
4.11. Exit questionnaire 
  
The exit questionnaire will be administered last, 
and will (a) assess reliability and trust, (b) account for 
potential confounds that would alter cortisol levels, and 
(c) collect demographic data.  
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